

# Security Vulnerability Notice

SE-2012-01-IBM-4

[Security vulnerabilities in Java SE, Issue 67#2]

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Security Explorations discovered that Issue 67 [1] reported to IBM in May 2013 was improperly fixed. According to the company, the vulnerability was addressed in a release of IBM Java from Jul 2013. Below, technical details of the flawed fix implementation are provided.

Issue 67 had its origin in an insecure use of `invoke` method of `java.lang.reflect.Method` class, which was called inside `AccessController`'s `doPrivileged` block. It could be successfully exploited to call `setSecurityManager` method of `java.lang.System` class. As a result, a complete Java security sandbox escape could be gained.

IBM patch for Issue 67 implemented the change to the code of `com.ibm.CORBA.iiop.ClientDelegate` class as illustrated on Fig. 1. Prior to the patch, the `ClientDelegate` class itself implemented `java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler` interface functionality and the vulnerable `invoke` call was directly exposed to all other classes. As a result of the patch, the `InvocationHandler` functionality along with the insecure call were simply moved into the private (inner) class.

### Outer class

**public class com.ibm.CORBA.iiop.ClientDelegate**

```
private Object createProxyServant(org.omg.CORBA.Object obj, Class c) {
    ...
    Object obj = futureentry.get(Proxy.newProxyInstance(c.getClassLoader(),
        aclass, clientDelegate0));
    ...
    return obj;
}
```

### Inner class

**private class ClientDelegate0 implements InvocationHandler**

```
public Object invoke(Object obj, Method method, Object args[]) {
    Vulnerable invoke() call inside doPrivileged block
}
```

- **Insecure invoke call moved into inner class**
- **No other security checks implemented**

Fig. 1 Illustration of a fix for Issue 67.

This functionality could be however still accessed through the dedicated Proxy object instance implementing `java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler` interface. The actual root cause of the issue hasn't been addressed at all. The `invoke` method of

java.lang.reflect.Method class was still insecurely used inside AccessController's doPrivileged block. There were no security checks introduced anywhere in the code. The patch relied solely on the idea that hiding the vulnerable method deep in the code and behind a Proxy class would be sufficient to address the issue.

Breaking IBM patch for Issue 67 requires only several minor changes to our original Proof of Concept code published in Jul 2013. It is simply a matter of gaining access to the Proxy object instance implementing the vulnerable method invocation and its invocation handler in particular. The required changes to our original POC code are illustrated on Fig. 2.




Fig. 2 The changes required to the original POC allowing for Issue 67 fix bypass.

We implemented a Proof of Concept code that illustrates the impact of the broken fix described above. It has been successfully tested in a 32-bit Linux OS environment and with the following versions of IBM SDK:

- IBM SDK, Java Technology Edition, Version 7.1 for Linux (32-bit x86) released on 2016-01-26 (build pxi3270\_27sr3fp30-20160112\_01(SR3 FP30))
- IBM SDK, Java Technology Edition, Version 8.0 for Linux (32-bit x86) released on 2016-01-26 (build pxi3280sr2fp10-20160108\_01(SR2 FP10))

We verified that, a complete Java security sandbox escape could be achieved with it.

## REFERENCES

[1] SE-2012-01-IBM-2, Issues 62-68

<http://www.security-explorations.com/materials/SE-2012-01-IBM-2.pdf>

## About Security Explorations

Security Explorations (<http://www.security-explorations.com>) is a security start-up company from Poland, providing various services in the area of security and vulnerability research. The company came to life in a result of a true passion of its founder for breaking security of things and analyzing software for security defects. Adam Gowdiak is the company's founder and its CEO. Adam is an experienced Java Virtual Machine hacker, with over 50 security issues uncovered in the Java technology over the recent years. He is also the hacking contest co-winner and the man who has put Microsoft Windows to its knees (vide MS03-026). He was also the first one to present successful and widespread attack against mobile Java platform in 2004.